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Recent Decisions
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FOURTH CIRCUIT
FIELDS v. PRATER: THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S LOST
OPPORTUNITY TO FURTHER DEFINE THE BOUNDARIES OF
POLITICAL PATRONAGE IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
JOSHUA J. MILLER*
In Fields v. Prater,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit considered whether it was constitutionally permissible
for a governmental authority to consider the political affiliation of
candidates when hiring a local director of social services and whether
defendants in such cases are entitled to qualified immunity from civil
liability.2 The court held that political affiliation was not an appropriate consideration for a local director’s position,3 but because the law
on this matter was unclear, the defendants were entitled to qualified
immunity.4 The court correctly found that considering political affiliation was unconstitutional in this case because the hiring authority
could not demonstrate that such a consideration was necessary for effective job performance.5 To reach that determination, the court
properly applied Fourth Circuit precedent and evaluated the position
at both a very high level of generality and at a more concrete level, but
failed to enhance the applicable test and provide further guidance to
lower courts by looking beyond circuit precedent.6 Finally, the court
properly granted the defendants qualified immunity because it was
legally unclear at the time of hiring that they had violated the plainCopyright  2010 by Joshua J. Miller.
* Joshua J. Miller is a second-year student at the University of Maryland School of
Law where he is a staff member for the Maryland Law Review. The author extends his
thanks to Professor Gordon Young of the University of Maryland School of Law for helpful
comments on the thesis. The author would also like to thank Notes & Comments Editor
Rachel Witriol for her thorough, meticulous editing. Finally, the author would also like to
extend his thanks to his mother, Barbara Hagy-Miller, for her continued love, support, and
encouragement.
1. 566 F.3d 381 (4th Cir. 2009).
2. Id. at 383.
3. Id. at 386.
4. Id. at 389–90.
5. See infra Part IV.A.
6. See infra Part IV.B.
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tiff’s constitutional rights, but in so doing it failed to provide any substantial guidance on when defendants in future cases involving
political affiliation and employment decisions should be entitled to
that defense.7
I.

THE CASE

In 2006, the position of Director for the Buchanan County, Virginia, Department of Social Services became available when the previous director retired.8 Tammy R. Fields and six other applicants
applied for the vacant position.9 To interview the applicants, the
Buchanan County Board of Supervisors selected an interviewing
board, which ranked each candidate based on both their application
and interview.10 Fields ranked the highest, while candidate Judy Holland ranked the lowest.11
Following the interviews, the Board of Supervisors opted to create
a new local administrative board for the county department of social
services,12 which assumed the duty of interviewing and hiring for the
director’s position.13 The new board interviewed three candidates, including Fields and Holland, before hiring Holland as the new
director.14
Fields, who had worked for the Buchanan County Department of
Social Services since 1995,15 protested, claiming that she had been
passed over for the director’s job because she was an active member of
the Republican Party.16 Fields maintained that the Board of Supervisors had intentionally appointed Democratic Party members to the
new administrative board so that a Democratic candidate, such as Holland, would be hired instead.17 Fields then brought suit against
7. See infra Part IV.C.
8. Fields v. Justus, No. 1:07cv019, 2008 WL 570951, at *2 (W.D. Va. Feb. 28, 2008).
The district judge noted that he largely omitted a discussion of the facts, as they were laid
out in detail in the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge assigned to the
case. Fields v. Justus, No. 1:07cv00019, 2008 WL 863723, at *1 n.4 (W.D. Va. Mar. 31,
2008).
9. Fields, 2008 WL 570951, at *2.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. Under Virginia law, a locality such as a county may appoint a local administrative board to run the county’s social services department or, alternatively, may designate
the local director as the local board. Fields, 2008 WL 863723, at *4 n.8.
13. Fields, 2008 WL 570951, at *2.
14. Id.
15. Id. Fields began her career with the department as a social worker in 1995 and was
promoted to Office Manager in 1997. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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Buchanan County, Judy Holland, the members of the Board of Supervisors, and the members of the local administrative board, alleging
that she was passed over for the director’s position because of her
political affiliation in violation of the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution.18
Each group of defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that
they were entitled to qualified immunity.19 In October 2007, Fields
filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the qualified immunity issue.20 On January 30, 2008, the still-pending motions to dismiss
and the motion for partial summary judgment were referred to a magistrate judge for report and recommendation.21
The magistrate judge recommended that the court deny the defendants’ motions to dismiss and motion for summary judgment on
the qualified immunity issue.22 He used a two-part test to determine if
qualified immunity applied—first, the facts alleged, taken in a light
most favorable to the plaintiff, must show that a constitutional right
was violated; and second, if the first inquiry indicated a violation, the
contours of the right must have been clearly established at the time of
violation.23 The magistrate judge reasoned that the defendants failed
to demonstrate that partisan affiliation was a criterion relevant to the
director’s position; thus, he reasoned that the defendants had violated
Fields’s rights.24 He then concluded that at the time Fields was denied the position, the defendants clearly knew or should have known
that using partisan affiliation to hire a director was a violation of her
constitutional rights, and thus the defendants were not entitled to
qualified immunity.25
The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia adopted the magistrate judge’s recommended disposition on all
the motions.26 The district court judge agreed that party affiliation
was not an appropriate factor on which to base the hiring decision for
the director’s position and that federal law clearly established that fact
at the time Fields’s promotion was considered.27 Accordingly, he
18. Id. at *1.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Fields v. Justus, No. 1:07cv00019, 2008 WL 863723, at *1 (W.D. Va. Mar. 31, 2008).
22. Fields, 2008 WL 570951, at *8.
23. Id. at *4.
24. Id. at *4–6.
25. Id. at *6–8.
26. Fields, 2008 WL 863723, at *1.
27. Id. at *4–6. The district judge was unsure if a “threshold inquiry,” used by the
magistrate, was created by case law. Id. at *3–4. As such, he approached the qualified
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granted Fields’s motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of
qualified immunity and denied the motions to dismiss from the members of the two boards.28 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether partisan affiliation
may be constitutionally used as a hiring criterion for certain government positions, and when qualified immunity is applicable if partisan
affiliation was wrongly considered in such a decision.29
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Several inquiries are required to determine whether partisan affiliation is appropriately considered in the hiring of a government employee or in other employment decisions involving such an employee.
First, under Supreme Court precedent, the court must determine
whether partisan affiliation is required for effective job performance.30 Within this framework, lower courts have been left to develop
their own approaches to political affiliation cases.31 Many circuits formulated their own unique tests to determine whether partisan affiliation was properly considered in a given employment decision.32 The
Fourth Circuit, however, adopted the First Circuit’s test, which involved a two-pronged examination of the nature of the position at issue, focusing first on the general issues surrounding a position and
second on the specific duties of the position.33 Simultaneously, a
court must often consider whether the defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity.34 Broad federal precedents establish a presumption of qualified immunity for a defendant that may be overcome by
showing that the plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated and that
it was legally clear or should have been clear to the defendant that his
or her actions entailed such a violation at the time of the action.35 A
court then examines circuit precedent to determine how the circuit
immunity analysis in a different manner than the magistrate, but reached the same result.
Id. at *4, *6.
28. Id. at *6. Buchanan County was dismissed as a defendant, as the magistrate judge
concluded that the county could only be held liable if it had adopted an “official policy”
mandating the consideration of party affiliation in hiring. Id.; Fields, 2008 WL 570951, at
*10.
29. Fields v. Prater, 566 F.3d 381, 383 (4th Cir. 2009), rev’g Fields v. Justus, No.
1:07cv00019, 2008 WL 863723 (W.D. Va. Mar. 31, 2008).
30. See infra Part II.A.
31. See infra Part II.B.
32. See infra Part II.B.1.
33. See infra Part II.B.2.
34. See infra Part II.C.
35. See infra Part II.C.1.
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treats the qualified immunity defense in political affiliation employment decision cases.36
A. The Supreme Court Determines If Consideration of Political
Affiliation Violates a Plaintiff’s Constitutional Rights by
Ascertaining Whether That Affiliation Is Necessary for
Effective Job Performance
Despite the historical entwinement of political affiliation and government employment, the United States Supreme Court did not truly
begin to address the issue of when political affiliation could be appropriately used as a criterion in government employment decisions until
about thirty years ago.37 Prior to that time, the Court merely hinted
that in some situations, political affiliation might not be an appropriate basis for hiring or refusing to hire an individual.38
Before the Court ever addressed this issue in the employment
context, it laid down several relevant general principles on the freedom of political affiliation. In 1943, the Court held in West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette39 that the State could not compel
public school students to salute and pledge allegiance to the American flag.40 Ordinary citizens, it said, could not be forced or otherwise
coerced to follow the prescriptions of government officials “in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.”41 The Court later
refined this pronouncement, finding that Americans have the right to
associate with the political party of their choice, a right that it called
“an integral part of . . . basic constitutional freedom.”42 Although
these broad statements did not directly relate to the issue of political
affiliation and government employment, they would nonetheless have
a profound impact on the issue.43
Beginning in the early 1960s, the Court considered several cases
that addressed employment decisions based on an employee’s affilia36. See infra Part II.C.2.
37. E.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 372–73 (1976) (plurality opinion) (finding the
practice of patronage dismissals unconstitutional for non-policymaking government
positions).
38. See, e.g., Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 898 (1961)
(stating in dicta that an individual could not constitutionally be kept from her employment
as a contractor at a government facility based on her political or religious affiliation).
39. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
40. Id. at 642.
41. Id.
42. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56–57 (1973).
43. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 356–57 (1976) (plurality opinion) (relying on
Barnette to find that government officials may not force public employees to relinquish
their right to political association).
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tion with certain political groups. In Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers
Union v. McElroy,44 the Court stated in dicta that an individual could
not constitutionally be excluded from a job at a government facility if
the “announced grounds for [the] exclusion had been patently arbitrary or discriminatory . . . [such as] because [the individual] was a
Democrat or a Methodist.”45 Six years later in Keyishian v. Board of
Regents,46 the Court struck down as unconstitutional a series of New
York statutes that barred members of the Communist Party from employment in the State’s university system.47
Then, in 1972 in Perry v. Sindermann,48 the Court considered the
case of a college professor who claimed that his contract had not been
renewed because he had been critical of the college’s administration
in his speech and activities.49 The Court stated firmly that although
the professor had no “right” to the valuable government benefit of
employment and that such a benefit could be denied “for any number
of reasons,” there were nonetheless “some reasons upon which the
government may not rely” when making employment decisions.50
The government, the Court said, was barred from denying a benefit to
an individual using any basis that infringes on constitutionally protected interests, such as the freedoms of speech and association.51
Just four years later, the Court applied the aforementioned principles and directly addressed the issue of political affiliation and government employment. In Elrod v. Burns,52 several non-civil service
employees of the Cook County, Illinois, sheriff’s department alleged
that they had been terminated from their positions because they were
not members of the new sheriff’s political party and had not sought
44. 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
45. Id. at 898. The dissent also agreed with this point, noting that “if [the] petitioner[’s] badge had been lifted avowedly on grounds of her race, religion, or political
opinions, the Court would concede that some constitutionally protected interest . . . had
been injured.” Id. at 900 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
46. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
47. Id. at 609–10 (determining that the prohibition’s wide sweep, based on “mere
knowing membership without any showing of specific intent to further the unlawful aims
of the Communist Party,” rendered the prohibitive laws invalid).
48. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
49. Id. at 595.
50. Id. at 597.
51. Id. The Court further stated that “if the government could deny a benefit to a
person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of
those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited.” Id. The Court upheld the
judgment of the court of appeals, which had remanded the case to the district court. Id. at
603.
52. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
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support from or affiliation with his party.53 A plurality led by Justice
Brennan acknowledged the longstanding practice of political patronage in American politics,54 but noted the sharp decline in the
practice in “recent times,” especially in the realm of public employment.55 Ultimately, the plurality found that the practice of patronage
“falls squarely within the prohibitions of Keyishian and Perry,”56 and
that “[t]he threat of dismissal for failure to provide . . . support [for
the favored party] unquestionably inhibits protected belief and association, and dismissal for failure to provide support only penalizes its
exercise.”57
Nonetheless, the Elrod plurality noted that some encroachment
on the First Amendment is permissible “for appropriate reasons.”58
The consideration of political affiliation, however, had to further a
vital government interest in a manner that was least restrictive of the
protected freedoms of belief and association, and the ultimate benefit
had to outweigh the lost constitutional rights.59 This balance could be
achieved if patronage dismissals were limited to “policymaking positions.”60 The plurality reasoned that non-policymaking employees
were “not in a position to thwart the goals of the in-party,” and should
be sheltered from partisan-based dismissal.61 Because “[n]o clear line
[could] be drawn between policymaking and non[-]policymaking positions,” however, a close examination of the nature of the responsibilities of a position would be critical to future cases.62
In 1980, the Court revisited the Elrod “policymaking” standard.
In Branti v. Finkel,63 two assistant public defenders from Rockland
County, New York, sought to prevent the county’s new public de53. Id. at 350–51 (plurality opinion).
54. Id. at 353.
55. Id. at 353–54.
56. Id. at 359.
57. Id. The plurality also noted that “regardless of how evenhandedly these restraints
may operate in the long run, after political office has changed hands several times, protected interests are still infringed and thus the violation remains.” Id. at 360.
58. Id. at 360.
59. Id. at 363.
60. Id. at 367–68.
61. Id.
62. Id. In contrast to the plurality’s reasoning, Justice Stewart did not believe that a
wide-ranging examination of and judgment on the constitutionality of the patronage system was appropriate. Id. at 374 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment). According to
Justice Stewart, the “single substantive question involved” was whether a non-policymaking,
non-confidential government employee could be terminated from his or her job on the
basis of political belief when his or her job performance was satisfactory. Id. at 375. He
believed that the employee could not. Id.
63. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
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fender from discharging them solely because they were Republicans.64
The lower courts held that they were not policymakers within the definition in Elrod, nor did they “occupy any confidential relationship to
the policymaking process” and thus could not be terminated based on
political affiliation.65 The Court affirmed,66 holding that “[t]o prevail
in this type of an action, it was sufficient, as Elrod holds, for respondents to prove that they were discharged” simply because they were
not affiliated with or sponsored by their supervisor’s political party.67
The Branti Court revised the Elrod standard. It grappled with the
same problem that Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion did four years
earlier—exactly when political affiliation was a legitimate factor to be
considered in patronage dismissals.68 It noted that in some circumstances, a position could be political even though it was not a policymaking or confidential position, while in other circumstances,
partisan affiliation would not necessarily be relevant to a policymaking
or confidential position.69 The Court thus jettisoned the “policymaking” distinction in favor of a more flexible inquiry.70 After Branti,
courts were not required to determine whether the labels of “policymaker” or “confidential”71 fit the position that was the subject of
litigation, but “whether the hiring authority [could] demonstrate that
party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved.”72

64. Id. at 508.
65. Id. at 510–11.
66. Id. at 520.
67. Id. at 517. The Court rejected the arguments of the chief public defender that
Elrod did not apply to the case at all because the plaintiffs had not been asked to seek the
support of the new in-party or change their partisan affiliation like the plaintiffs in Elrod.
Id. at 516. The Court noted that accepting this premise would repudiate entirely the conclusion of both the plurality and Justice Stewart in Elrod, which was that the First Amendment forbids the dismissal of a public employee on the sole basis of political beliefs. Id. at
516–17.
68. Id. at 518.
69. Id.
70. See id. (creating a new standard based on whether party affiliation reasonably affects job performance).
71. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 375 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment) (adding the descriptive term of “confidential” to the plurality’s focus on
“policymakers”).
72. Branti, 445 U.S. at 518. Justice Stewart dissented, arguing that the assistant public
defenders, as lawyers, were not non-confidential employees. Id. at 520–21 (Stewart, J., dissenting). He analogized to a private firm, stating, “I can think of few occupational relationships more instinct with the necessity of mutual confidence and trust than that kind of
professional association.” Id. at 521.
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The synthesized rule laid down in Elrod and Branti proved workable and it remained in use a decade later.73 The Court, however, revisited the Elrod-Branti rule in 1990 due to its inherent limitations—
the prohibition against the consideration of political affiliation in government jobs applied only to dismissals.74 In Rutan v. Republican Party
of Illinois,75 the Court was asked to determine whether the Elrod-Branti
line of cases applied to other employment decisions.76
In Rutan, the governor of Illinois was accused of operating a patronage system that limited state employment and its related benefits
to members of the Republican Party through a statewide freeze on all
government employment decisions.77 Exceptions to the freeze could
be made only with the governor’s “express permission.”78 The Court
reasoned that although government employees have no legal entitlement to promotion, transfer, or recall after layoff, if such an employee
is adversely affected by any of these actions based solely on political
affiliation, his or her constitutional rights have been violated.79 The
Court maintained that the same concerns that underlaid Elrod and
Branti were present here—employees who refused to compromise
their beliefs stood to lose out on substantial benefits and to incur significant penalties.80 It separately considered the issue of political affiliation in relation to hiring for a government position and reached a
similar conclusion.81 As such, the Elrod-Branti rule governing political
affiliation and dismissal was extended to cover those other types of
decisions.82
B. Each Circuit Was Left to Develop Its Own Approach to Political
Affiliation Cases Within the Broad Framework Laid Down by
the Supreme Court
The Elrod and Branti decisions provided a general framework
within which the district courts and circuit courts of appeals could
73. See Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 71–74, 76–79 (1990) (upholding the Elrod-Branti line of cases and expanding their application to promotions, transfers,
recalls from layoff, and hiring).
74. See id. (revisiting the Elrod-Branti rule and acknowledging that it should apply more
broadly); see also Branti, 445 U.S. at 520 (majority opinion) (affirming an injunction against
a politically motivated termination of employment).
75. 497 U.S. 62.
76. Id. at 71–79.
77. Id. at 65–66.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 72–73.
80. Id. at 74.
81. Id. at 79.
82. Id.
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operate.83 The lower federal courts have since added considerably to
the body of case law in a manner consistent with the course charted by
the Supreme Court.84 Several circuits have developed their own
unique tests to determine when political affiliation is “an appropriate
requirement for the effective performance of the public office”85 that
is at issue in a given case.86 Other circuits, such as the Fourth Circuit,
first developed their own standards within the Elrod-Branti framework,
but later adopted another circuit’s test.87
1. The First, Second, and Sixth Circuits Developed Their Own
Unique Elrod-Branti Tests
Following the Elrod and Branti decisions, a number of circuits developed their own tests within the Supreme Court’s broader framework.88 Each used a case or a short series of cases on the issue of
political affiliation and government employment to apply the ElrodBranti rules in a manner that it believed best fit the Supreme Court’s
pronouncements.89
In the First Circuit case of Jimenez Fuentes v. Torres Gaztambide,90
the two plaintiffs were removed from their positions as regional directors in a Puerto Rican urban development agency after their party was
defeated at the polls.91 The court used the case to create its own test
within the Elrod-Branti framework.92 It acknowledged that
“[i]dentifying generic categories of positions where partisan selection
and rejection are permissible has . . . proven to be an elusive and
83. See, e.g., Jimenez Fuentes v. Torres Gaztambide, 807 F.2d 236, 240 (1st Cir. 1986)
(en banc) (“To the skeletal teachings of Elrod and Branti have been added a considerable
body of case law from circuit courts of appeal and district courts.”).
84. Id. at 240–41.
85. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980).
86. See infra Part II.B.1.
87. See infra Part II.B.2.
88. This Section focuses on the tests developed in three federal circuits—specifically,
the First, Second, and Sixth Circuits—although others have developed their own unique
approaches. See, e.g., Boyle v. County of Allegheny, 139 F.3d 386, 396 (3d Cir. 1998) (eschewing a formal test because a “lack of explicit guidance . . . results in a greater flexibility
on the part of lower courts to determine each case under its own facts and in its own
context”).
89. E.g., Regan v. Boogertman, 984 F.2d 577, 580–81 (2d Cir. 1993) (listing several
inquiries useful in deciding whether a position is one for which party loyalty is an appropriate criterion); Savage v. Gorski, 850 F.2d 64, 68–69 (2d Cir. 1988) (weighing various factors
to determine whether political affiliation was an appropriate criterion for a termination
without stating that those factors must be considered in all cases).
90. 807 F.2d 236 (1st Cir. 1986) (en banc).
91. Id. at 237–38.
92. See id. at 241–42 (analyzing the Branti framework and applying it to this case).
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intractable task,” but it believed that certain useful approaches became evident as more courts addressed the issue.93
First, the court noted that a general threshold inquiry into
whether the position related at all to “‘partisan political interests. . . .
[or] concerns’” appeared appropriate based on the Branti decision.94
The key to this inquiry was whether “the position involve[d] government decisionmaking on issues where there is room for political disagreement on goals or their implementation.”95 If the first inquiry was
satisfied, the next step involved a more particularized examination of
the responsibilities of the position at issue to determine if party affiliation appeared to be an appropriate requirement for the job.96 This
inquiry was meant to “focus on the powers inherent in a given office,
as opposed to the functions performed by a particular occupant of
that office.”97 In the end, the court recognized that a case-by-case determination using this test would be necessary.98
The Second Circuit also developed its own test. In Savage v. Gorski,99 the court sought to interpret the language of the Branti opinion.100 It gleaned a general rule “that political affiliation is an
appropriate requirement when there is a rational connection between
shared ideology and job performance.”101 Later cases refined this inquiry by focusing on the functions of the position to determine
whether such a connection existed.102 The court listed several factors
to consider, including the following:
[W]hether the employee (1) is exempt from civil service protection, (2) has some technical competence or expertise, (3)
controls others, (4) is authorized to speak in the name of
policymakers, (5) is perceived as a policymaker by the public,
(6) influences government programs, (7) has contact with
elected officials, and (8) is responsive to partisan politics and
political leaders.103
93. Id. at 241.
94. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 519 (1980)).
95. Id. at 241–42.
96. Id. at 242.
97. Id.
98. See id. (noting that in each case, the court must consider a list of relevant factors).
99. 850 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1988).
100. Id. at 68.
101. Id.
102. E.g., Vezzetti v. Pellegrini, 22 F.3d 483, 486 (2d Cir. 1994); Regan v. Boogertman,
984 F.2d 577, 580 (2d Cir. 1993).
103. Vezzetti, 22 F.3d at 486; see also Regan, 984 F.2d at 580 (outlining the factors that
were explicitly adopted by the court in Vezzetti one year later).
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The court said that all relevant factors should be assessed together,
with none accorded dispositive weight.104 It later found that in some
situations, an analysis of only the eight factors listed could be sufficient and settled on their use as the starting point for an Elrod-Branti
analysis.105
The Sixth Circuit, like others, noted that the Supreme Court “left
it to subsequent courts to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether
political affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office.”106 The court found that the position
in question must be closely examined with a particular focus on “the
inherent duties of the position in question,” rather than what duties
the individual holding the position actually performed.107 It reasoned
that a position might appear to be a policymaking position, but the
employee, through his work, could make it a largely ministerial position protected from patronage dismissal.108 An additional inquiry was
later added, looking into “the duties that the new holder of that position will perform.”109 Thus, even if an individual is dismissed from a
position that is determined to be non-political, if his or her replacement is to be given new, political job duties, the dismissal may be constitutional.110 The broader the responsibilities and the less defined
they are, the more likely it is that political affiliation is an appropriate
requirement for the position.111 Finally, the court also attempted
later to formulate broad categories of positions that fall within the
Elrod-Branti exception to the general prohibition against patronage
dismissal.112
104. Vezzetti, 22 F.3d at 486.
105. Gordon v. County of Rockland, 110 F.3d 886, 889–90 (2d Cir. 1997).
106. Williams v. City of River Rouge, 909 F.2d 151, 153 (6th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980)).
107. Id. at 154.
108. Id. at 154–55.
109. Faughender v. City of North Olmsted, 927 F.2d 909, 913 (6th Cir. 1991).
110. See id. at 914 (finding that “[a] mayor could decide to transform any non-civil service position into a position for which political considerations are appropriate provided he
acts with a good faith belief that such a transformation is necessary to implement his
policies”).
111. Rice v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 14 F.3d 1133, 1142 n.9 (6th Cir. 1994).
112. McCloud v. Testa, 97 F.3d 1536, 1557 (6th Cir. 1996). The court’s categories included the following:
Category One: positions specifically named in relevant federal, state, county, or
municipal law to which discretionary authority with respect to the enforcement of
that law or the carrying out of some other policy of political concern is granted;
Category Two: positions to which a significant portion of the total discretionary
authority available to category one position-holders has been delegated; or positions not named in law, possessing by virtue of the jurisdiction’s pattern or practice the same quantum or type of discretionary authority commonly held by
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The Fourth Circuit Devised Its Own Elrod-Branti Test Before
Adopting the Approach of the First Circuit

The Fourth Circuit approached the issue of political affiliation
and job performance in a unique manner. In its first case implicating
the Elrod-Branti standard, Jones v. Dodson,113 the Fourth Circuit held
that the job of deputy sheriff in any sheriff’s department could not “be
found to involve policymaking related to ‘partisan political interests’
[or] to involve access to confidential information ‘bearing . . . on partisan political concerns.’”114 In the end, however, the court reached
this conclusion without making any factual inquiry into the inherent
duties and responsibilities of the position, on which other circuits focused.115 The court later eroded Jones when, in Joyner v. Lancaster,116 it
ruled that a deputy sheriff who had overtly campaigned for the sheriff’s opponent in a primary election was properly dismissed.117 It
noted that as a high ranking subordinate of the sheriff, the deputy
“had an important role to play in the implementation of the sheriff’s
policies, [that] he was an essential link between the sheriff and the
deputies whom he supervised,” and that his campaign activities had
actually created a significant disruption within the office, justifying his
termination.118
Later that same year, the Fourth Circuit considered McConnell v.
Adams,119 a case that called for a direct application of the Elrod-Branti
principles. The court again declined to announce any clear guiding
test or principles as it sought to determine if Virginia electoral boards
could refuse to rehire electoral registrars based on their political affilicategory one positions in other jurisdictions; Category Three: confidential advisors who spend a significant portion of their time on the job advising category
one or category two position-holders on how to exercise their statutory or delegated policymaking authority, or other confidential employees who control the
lines of communications to category one positions, category two positions or confidential advisors; Category Four: positions that are part of a group of positions
filled by balancing out political party representation, or that are filled by balancing out selections made by different governmental agents or bodies.
Id. (footnote call numbers omitted).
113. 727 F.2d 1329 (4th Cir. 1984).
114. Id. at 1338 (alteration in original) (citing and quoting Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S.
507, 519 (1980)).
115. Id. at 1337–39; see supra Part II.B.1.
116. 815 F.2d 20 (4th Cir. 1987).
117. Id. at 24.
118. Id. The court in Joyner did not consider the deputy’s case within the context of
Elrod-Branti, but applied the jurisprudence of a separate line of cases involving “[t]he legality of discipline imposed upon a public employee because of the employee’s speech.” Id. at
22–23.
119. 829 F.2d 1319 (4th Cir. 1987).
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ation.120 The court did, however, undertake a cursory examination of
several state statutes with some bearing on the issue of political affiliation and job performance in government employment and determined they constituted additional evidence that partisan affiliation
was not relevant to the performance of the position at issue.121 Ultimately, though, the court failed to undertake a thorough examination
of the position.122
Adrift in a sea of indecision of its own making, the Fourth Circuit
eventually looked to its sister circuits for guidance on the Elrod-Branti
framework and, in Stott v. Haworth,123 settled on a test that it would
apply in cases involving political affiliation and job performance in
government employment.124 The Stott court adopted the two-pronged
test articulated by the First Circuit in Jimenez Fuentes125 as the method
“to properly render a decision on the propriety of a patronage dismissal.”126 Thereafter, in applying the test, courts within the Fourth Circuit were required to first examine the position at issue in a high
degree of generality, and then to examine more closely the position’s
specific duties if the first prong indicated that the position might not
be constitutionally protected from patronage dismissal.127
In 1993, the Fourth Circuit again considered a case involving political affiliation and job performance in Akers v. Caperton.128 The ruling in Akers only once explicitly referenced the Stott decision, and did
not note the two-pronged test that the court had adopted three years
earlier, but it did apply the general principles embodied by Stott.129
The court examined at both a broader level and a more specific level
the duties of a West Virginia County Maintenance Superintendent
and ultimately concluded that “there is no rational connection between shared ideology and the performance of this low-level job.”130
120. Id. at 1324. The court noted that “[c]ourts have treated failure to rehire as the
equivalent of dismissal in applying Branti to patronage employment practices.” Id.
121. Id.
122. See id. (providing only a cursory overview of the position).
123. 916 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1990).
124. Id. at 141.
125. Jimenez Fuentes v. Torres Gaztambide, 807 F.2d 236, 241–42 (1st Cir. 1986) (en
banc); see also supra text accompanying notes 90–98.
126. Stott, 916 F.2d at 141.
127. See id. at 141–42 (adopting the First Circuit’s two-pronged test).
128. 998 F.2d 220 (4th Cir. 1993). Here, the employment decision at issue was a transfer, not a dismissal. Id. at 223.
129. See id. at 224–25 (applying the Stott principles without a citation to Stott).
130. Id. The opinion noted that political affiliation was not a requirement for the position’s immediate superiors, so it was difficult to imagine that political affiliation should be
a requirement for the position at issue. Id. at 225.
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The Fourth Circuit soon became more diligent in its application
of the Stott test. In 1997, the court, sitting en banc, applied the test to
the position of deputy sheriff in Jenkins v. Medford.131 The court concluded that, in the state of North Carolina, “the office of deputy sheriff is that of a policymaker, and that deputy sheriffs are the alter ego of
the sheriff generally, for whose conduct he is liable,” based on the twopart examination of the office.132 Recognizing the conflict with Jones,
the court noted that it disagreed with that decision “to the extent it
suggests that no deputy sheriff can ever be a policymaker” and instructed the district courts to apply Stott in the future.133
The Fourth Circuit has used this approach ever since.134 As recently as 2008, in Nader v. Blair,135 the court affirmed the Stott test as
the Fourth Circuit’s exclusive method for determining whether the
performance of a government job relates sufficiently to partisan political interests, such that those interests become a criterion for the
job.136 The Fourth Circuit thus appears satisfied that it has adopted a
worthwhile and durable test.137
C. The Defense of Qualified Immunity Is Frequently Implicated in
Political Affiliation Cases
The idea that government officials should, in certain situations,
be immune to civil liability for their actions has a long history in
American jurisprudence.138 Over time, the immunity granted primarily to judicial officers, elected officials, and, in some instances, police
131. 119 F.3d 1156, 1162–64 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
132. Id. at 1164.
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., Knight v. Vernon, 214 F.3d 544, 548–51 (4th Cir. 2000) (examining the job
duties of a position and holding that a jailer’s political allegiance to a sheriff was not an
appropriate requirement for the performance of her job and that she was protected from
dismissal for failing to support the sheriff in an election).
135. 549 F.3d 953 (4th Cir. 2008).
136. Id. at 958–60 (examining the nature of the responsibilities of an Assistant Director
of the Baltimore City Department of Social Services and holding that the position was one
for which partisan affiliation was an appropriate job criterion).
137. The Fourth Circuit has also noted that “state law cannot control the analysis” made
within the Elrod-Branti framework, though pronouncements of state law on the relationship
between a position and political affiliation can be considered. McCrerey v. Allen, 118 F.3d
242, 244–45 (4th Cir. 1997).
138. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553–55 (1967) (noting that immunity granted
to certain government officials for their actions in their official capacity is given so they
may exercise their functions in an independent manner without fear of consequences);
Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498–99 (1896) (finding that immunity from civil liability
extended to the heads of executive departments for actions taken while “exercising the
functions of [their] office[s]”); Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 579–81 (2d Cir. 1949)
(discussing the absolute immunity from civil liability of judicial officers and Justice Depart-
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officers, expanded to cover other government employees, such as congressional aides.139 The defense of qualified immunity, which permits
defendant government officials to escape civil liability in some cases, is
one variety of immunity that has developed from this general background.140 This type of immunity has never been applied by the Supreme Court in the context of political affiliation and government
employment decisions, but various federal circuits nonetheless have
recognized its applicability in such cases.141
1. The Supreme Court Developed the Qualified Immunity Defense to
Protect Defendant Government Officials from Civil Suits
When Their Conduct Did Not Violate Clearly
Established Constitutional Rights
The Supreme Court has long recognized that different levels and
different types of immunity may be applicable to a government official
depending on his or her position and on the circumstances that
might give rise to legal action against that official.142 The defense of
qualified immunity arose from this line of reasoning and initially allowed a defendant government official to claim that his or her conduct “was justified by an objectively reasonable belief that it was
lawful.”143
The Court’s seminal decision on the defense of qualified immunity came in 1982 in Harlow v. Fitzgerald.144 In Harlow, the petitioners
Bryce Harlow and Alexander Butterfield allegedly entered into a conspiracy “in their capacities as senior White House aides to former President Richard M. Nixon” to violate respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald’s
constitutional and statutory rights.145 The Court granted certiorari
because it had “[n]ever . . . determined the immunity available to the
senior aides and advisers of the President of the United States.”146 It
noted that previous decisions consistently held that government offiment officials conducting their official duties so that they might conduct those duties without fear of burdensome and expensive litigation).
139. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 621–22 (1972) (explaining that the immunity privilege granted to a congressional aide is viewed as the privilege of the legislator for
whom he or she works, may be invoked only by the legislator or by the aide on the legislator’s behalf, and “is confined to those services that would be immune legislative conduct if
performed by the [legislator] himself”).
140. See infra Part II.C.1.
141. See infra Part II.C.2.
142. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247–48 (1974).
143. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).
144. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
145. Id. at 802.
146. Id. at 806.
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cials are entitled to, at a minimum, “some form of immunity from
suits for damages,” and that in cases involving executive officials, qualified immunity was generally “the norm.”147
Examining the defense of qualified immunity in light of its earlier
cases,148 the Court found that “[q]ualified or ‘good faith’ immunity”149 involved both an objective150 and a subjective element.151 The
subjective element, however, often “proved incompatible with [the]
admonition . . . that insubstantial claims should not proceed to
trial.”152 The Court reformulated the standard for qualified immunity, concluding that “bare allegations of malice should not suffice to
subject government officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery.”153 It held that “government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”154 It reasoned that by relying on a
more objective standard, “measured by reference to clearly established law,” any excessive disruption of government would be avoided
as insubstantial claims could be resolved through summary
judgment.155
The Court further clarified the standards announced in Harlow in
Anderson v. Creighton.156 In Anderson, the Court was faced with a suit
against an FBI agent as a result of a warrantless search of the plaintiffs’
home.157 The agent claimed he was entitled to qualified immunity
because he believed exigent circumstances permitted the search.158
147. Id. at 806–07.
148. Id.; see also Gomez, 446 U.S. at 640 (stating that a government official can claim
qualified immunity based on an objectively reasonable belief that his or her actions were
lawful).
149. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815.
150. The court stated that the “objective element involves a presumptive knowledge of
and respect for ‘basic, unquestioned constitutional rights.’” Id. (quoting Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975)).
151. The subjective element, in contrast, “refers to ‘permissible intentions.’” Id. (quoting Wood, 420 U.S. at 322).
152. Id. at 815–16.
153. Id. at 817–18.
154. Id. at 818.
155. Id. The Court stated that by redefining qualified immunity in more objective
terms, it was by no means providing a “license to lawless conduct.” Id. at 819. The public
interest in deterring unlawful conduct and in the compensation of victims remained protected since an official “could be expected to know that certain conduct would violate
statutory or constitutional rights” and would thus hesitate to take such action. Id.
156. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
157. Id. at 637.
158. Id.
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The Court stated that for a constitutional right to be “clearly established,” as Harlow called for, the “contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he
[was] doing violate[d] that right.”159 The Court was equally clear,
however, that not every official action was protected.160 Expressing an
unwillingness to complicate the qualified immunity doctrine, the
Court refused to tie the “scope or extent” of immunity to the nature
of the defendant’s official duties or to the character of the rights that
had been violated.161 As the Court saw it, “[a]n immunity that has as
many variants as there are modes of official action and types of rights
would not give conscientious officials that assurance of protection that
it is the object of the doctrine to provide.”162 As such, the agent was
ultimately entitled to qualified immunity.163
The Court also made several pronouncements on the manner in
which qualified immunity claims should be addressed. For example,
it stated that when a court seeks to determine if a constitutional right
asserted by a plaintiff was “clearly established” at the time the defendant acted, it must, as a legal matter, determine “whether the plaintiff
has asserted a violation of a constitutional right at all.”164 If not, the
suit can be “weed[ed] out” before any further analysis on the issue of
qualified immunity is even required.165
In Saucier v. Katz,166 the Court further explained that in light of
Anderson, a qualified immunity claim must be evaluated using two inquiries: First, a court must determine “whether a constitutional right
would have been violated on the facts alleged,” and second, “assuming
the violation is established, the question [of] whether the right was
clearly established must be considered on a more specific level.”167
The Court feared that by skipping the first inquiry entirely, principles
which might become the basis for a holding that the right was clearly
established in the latter inquiry would be missed entirely.168 Recently,
however, a unanimous Court retreated from this position in the 2009
159. Id. at 640.
160. Id. (“This is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity
unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful, but it is to say that in
the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.” (citations omitted)).
161. Id. at 643.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 646.
164. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991) (emphasis added).
165. Id.
166. 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
167. Id. at 200. The “more specific level” inquiry involved asking whether the right was
“clearly established” as called for in Harlow. Id. at 201.
168. Id. at 201.
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case of Pearson v. Callahan,169 holding that while this approach was
“often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory.”170
Instead, the Court permitted the lower courts “to exercise their sound
discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in
the particular case at hand.”171
2. The Fourth Circuit and Other Circuits Have Applied the Qualified
Immunity Defense in Political Affiliation Employment
Decision Cases
None of the Supreme Court’s decisions addressing political affiliation and its relationship to government employment mentions the
defense of qualified immunity.172 This does not mean, however, that
the circuit courts of appeals have failed to employ the defense in that
context: Both the Fourth Circuit173 and others have applied qualified
immunity to political affiliation cases.174
The circuit courts of appeals have not deviated from the prescriptions of the Supreme Court on qualified immunity.175 In political affiliation cases generally, the courts have largely integrated their
individual Elrod-Branti analyses into the qualified immunity defense,
using those analyses to determine whether a plaintiff’s constitutional
rights were in fact violated.176 Under the “clearly established” prong
169. 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009).
170. Id. at 818.
171. Id. The Court found that the “rigid” Saucier protocol sometimes caused “a substantial expenditure of scarce judicial resources on difficult questions that have no effect on
the outcome of the case.” Id. The Court added that “[t]here are cases in which it is plain
that a constitutional right is not clearly established but far from obvious whether in fact
there is such a right.” Id.
172. See, e.g., Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 79 (1990) (extending the
rule of Elrod and Branti to include promotion, transfer, recall, and hiring without any mention of whether defendants might be entitled to qualified immunity, even though ElrodBranti never previously covered those employment decisions).
173. See, e.g., Pike v. Osborne, 301 F.3d 182, 184–85 (4th Cir. 2002) (evaluating a sheriff’s claim of qualified immunity and granting immunity after he failed to rehire two dispatchers who campaigned for his opponent).
174. See, e.g., McCloud v. Testa, 97 F.3d 1536, 1560–62 (6th Cir. 1996) (refusing to grant
qualified immunity to a county auditor who fired several individuals because uncertainty
about the duties of their positions raised questions as to whether a constitutional right had
been violated and granting qualified immunity to the auditor in the dismissal of an administrative assistant because that position was inherently political).
175. See, e.g., Pike, 301 F.3d at 184–85 (citing Saucier and Anderson to resolve a qualified
immunity issue).
176. See, e.g., McCloud, 97 F.3d at 1560–62 (examining various positions from which the
defendant, who claimed qualified immunity, dismissed various plaintiffs to determine if
political affiliation was constitutionally considered in the dismissals).
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of the qualified immunity analysis, the lower courts have rejected a
universal application of immunity to all defendants in political affiliation cases despite a lack of bright line rules under the Elrod-Branti
framework; the presence of such bright line rules would more likely
make it appear that a plaintiff’s rights were clearly established.177
Echoing the Supreme Court in Anderson, the Third Circuit, for example, stated that it could not “[look] at the constitutional issue too abstractly.”178 While a right had to be “clearly established” in order to
defeat an official’s qualified immunity claim, a regime that always allowed immunity in political affiliation cases was untenable “because
the lack of ‘bright line’ rules inherent in the doctrine [of Elrod-Branti]
would continually provide cover for violations of constitutional
rights.”179
The Fourth Circuit has been no less diligent in its application of
the Supreme Court’s precedents when confronted with qualified immunity claims in political affiliation cases.180 First, it is clear that the
Fourth Circuit also uses its Elrod-Branti analysis to determine whether a
plaintiff’s constitutional rights have been violated under the first
prong of the qualified immunity test.181 As to the test’s second prong,
the court has firmly stated that “a strict factual nexus” between the
actions of a defendant and the precedent case that established the
right allegedly violated is not required.182 Only when a “legitimate
question” as to whether the principles previously announced extended to the new case or if the new case itself might create “an exception to those principles” was a court to sustain a qualified immunity
defense.183 As the court later stated, “Officials are not liable for bad
177. See, e.g., Assaf v. Fields, 178 F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir. 1999) (rejecting the appellee’s
argument that qualified immunity was best suited to cases where no bright line rule existed
since such a regime would almost always allow defendants to escape liability in political
affiliation cases).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. The Fourth Circuit declines to conduct the entire qualified immunity analysis when
it believes that its Elrod-Branti analysis makes such an analysis superfluous. See, e.g., Nader v.
Blair, 549 F.3d 953, 962 n.2 (4th Cir. 2008) (“The Defendants alternatively claimed that
the decision of the district court should be affirmed on the grounds of qualified immunity.
Because we find that the Defendants have committed no constitutional violation, we need
not consider their claim of qualified immunity.”).
181. See id. (declining to further consider the defendants’ claim of qualified immunity
because they committed no constitutional violation).
182. McConnell v. Adams, 829 F.2d 1319, 1325 (4th Cir. 1987) (“Public officials must
consider the possible relevance of legal principles established in analogous factual contexts.”); see also supra note 160.
183. McConnell, 829 F.2d at 1325.
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guesses in gray areas; they are liable for transgressing bright lines.”184
The court believed that holding a government official liable because
he or she did not predict the outcome of future litigation “‘would
work a miscarriage of justice.’”185
When the Supreme Court laid down its new guidelines for conducting a qualified immunity analysis in Saucier, the Fourth Circuit
adopted the new test without question or complaint.186 In fact, the
court’s first opportunity to apply this new rule was in a case involving
an alleged dismissal from a government job based on political expression.187 Given these precedents, it is clear that although the Supreme
Court has not directly addressed the issue of qualified immunity in
cases involving political affiliation and government employment actions, the federal circuits clearly recognize that it is a vital issue in this
area.188
III.

THE COURT’S REASONING

In Fields v. Prater,189 the Fourth Circuit unanimously reversed the
judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District
of Virginia and held that although political affiliation was not a
proper criterion on which to base a hiring decision for a local director
of social services in Virginia, because that conclusion was not previously clearly established as unconstitutional, the defendants were enti184. Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 1992).
185. Akers v. Caperton, 998 F.2d 220, 227 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting Swanson v. Powers,
937 F.2d 965, 967 (4th Cir. 1991)). The court recognized that, under Harlow, “the critical
inquiry is the state of the law at the time of the official’s actions, not the result reached after
years of judicial pondering.” Id.
186. See Pike v. Osborne, 301 F.3d 182, 184–85 (4th Cir. 2002) (resolving a qualified
immunity issue using the order of inquiries prescribed in Saucier). It is unquestionably the
duty of the court to follow the Supreme Court’s pronouncements, but the Supreme Court
acknowledged the extensive criticism of Saucier’s “rigid order of battle” protocol by many
lower court judges when it retreated from Saucier in 2009. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct.
808, 817 (2009).
187. Pike, 301 F.3d at 184–85.
188. The Supreme Court has also addressed another area that has clear implications for
the relationship between political affiliation and government employment that the circuit
courts of appeals are likely to encounter—the applicability of state administrative regulations as a method to overcome a qualified immunity defense. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S.
183, 193–97 (1984); see also Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 515 (1994) (noting that the
Ninth Circuit failed to properly address whether qualified immunity applies to violations of
state law). The Elder Court noted that, under Davis, an official’s “clear violation” of a state
administrative regulation does not allow a plaintiff to overcome the defense of qualified
immunity put forth by the official. Id. The clearly established “right” alleged to have been
violated must be a federal right on which a claim for relief is based. Id.
189. 566 F.3d 381 (4th Cir. 2009).
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tled to qualified immunity.190 Writing for the court, Judge Wilkinson
explained that the key determination the court had to make was
whether the position in question was one for which consideration of
party affiliation was an “appropriate requirement.”191 He then explained that, if it were inappropriate to consider partisan affiliation,
then a claim of qualified immunity could be defeated only if a defendant violated “clearly established” rights that a reasonable individual
in his or her position would have recognized.192 The court examined
each of these issues in turn.
The court first focused on the appropriateness of using partisan
affiliation as a factor in the hiring of government employees by asking
whether the position at issue involved “policymaking.”193 It reasoned
that such an examination, although not determinative, was nonetheless “helpful” because it could assist in demonstrating whether consideration of partisan affiliation was appropriate for a given position.194
The court used the Fourth Circuit’s two-part test to conduct the
analysis.195
First, the court asked whether the position in question involved
any decisionmaking on issues where there was “room for political disagreement on goals or their implementation.”196 Second, because the
first inquiry was satisfied, the court focused on the particular position’s responsibilities to determine if the position “resemble[d] a policymaker.”197 In the first prong of the analysis, the court concluded
that at a very high level of generality, a local director of social services
could be considered a policymaking position.198 Upon a more “concrete analysis” under the second prong, however, it concluded that
190. Id. at 383.
191. Id. at 386 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S.
507, 518 (1980)) (explaining that a court’s inquiry does not involve particular labels, but is
whether “‘the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved’” (quoting Branti,
445 U.S. at 518)).
192. Id. at 389.
193. Id. at 386.
194. Id. The court noted Supreme Court precedent which explicitly stated that the label of “policymaker” was not determinative of whether partisan affiliation was an appropriate criterion in hiring decisions. Id. (citing Branti, 445 U.S. at 518).
195. Id.
196. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Stott v. Haworth, 916 F.2d 134,
141–42 (4th Cir. 1990)).
197. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Stott, 916 F.2d at 142). The court
noted that the second prong of the analysis was to be undertaken only “[i]f this first inquiry is satisfied.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Stott, 916 F.2d at
141–42).
198. Id.
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the particular position at issue was “not one for which political affiliation [was] an appropriate consideration.”199 The court noted that in
Virginia, most social services policy is set at either the federal or the
state level, while most residual policymaking authority resides with the
local board.200
The court did note that the local director possesses some policymaking authority, but it is generally limited to the realm of office
organization and supervision.201 It reasoned that if this low-level authority were sufficient to exempt the position from the First Amendment protections sought by Fields, then “only the most low-level
government employees would be protected from politically-based hiring and firing.”202 Ultimately, the court found that no rational connection existed between political ideology and job performance for a
local director of social services in Virginia.203
The court also rejected the defendants’ argument that because
the local director dealt with “confidential” information, political affiliation was a relevant hiring criterion under the existing case law.204 It
reasoned that many social services workers also work with such information due to the nature of their jobs, but that partisan affiliation is
not an appropriate criterion on which to judge their performance.205
The court argued that this was simply an attempt by the defendants to
fit the local director’s position into the broad category of “confidential” without a sufficient explanation of how political affiliation was
actually relevant to the position.206
The court also reasoned that Virginia’s explicit designation of the
position as “non-partisan” was a significant signal that partisan affiliation was not an appropriate criterion on which to base a hiring decision.207 It recognized that the ultimate question was still one of
federal, not state, law, but found that the State’s decision to prohibit
hiring decisions based on partisan affiliation was relevant to determining whether such affiliation is required for effective job performance.208 The court explained that here, both state law and
constitutional law were “pulling in the same direction,” with the for199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 386–87.
at 387.

at 387–88.
at 388.
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mer protecting “professional merit in employment” while the latter
guarded against retribution based on an individual’s political
beliefs.209
The court then considered whether the violated constitutional
rights were clearly established at the time of the hiring decision to
determine if the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.210 It
noted that although the defendants should have known that state regulations forbade them from considering partisan affiliation when hiring a local director, the violation of a state administrative regulation
did not overcome a qualified immunity claim.211 Rather, the court
elaborated, a “reasonable official” must have clearly understood that
making such a hiring decision based on partisan affiliation “contravened the First Amendment.”212
The court explained that, at the time of the hiring decision in
Fields’s case, the law was not clearly established in that regard.213 It
noted that the factors under consideration often required “particularized inquiries into specific positions in the context of specific systems,” making it difficult to clearly demarcate those positions for
which partisan affiliation could be considered and those for which it
could not.214 The court reasoned that the fact-intensive inquiries required in this and other cases indicated that no bright line rule existed about which the members of the two boards should have
known.215 Thus, because the court could not say with certainty that
the defendants knew or should have known they were violating

209. Id. The court stressed that its reasoning was consistent with the holding in Nader v.
Blair, 549 F.3d 953 (4th Cir. 2008), in which the court concluded that an assistant director
of a social services department in Maryland was a policymaking position, Fields, 566 F.3d at
388–89 (citing Nader, 549 F.3d 953). The court noted that Maryland law, unlike Virginia,
gave local social services employees “significantly more power to shape local policy.” Id.
Furthermore, Maryland law permitted dismissal from such positions for any reason. Id. at
389.
210. Fields, 566 F.3d at 389–90.
211. Id. at 389.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. The closest analogue the court could find to Fields was McConnell v. Adams, 829
F.2d 1319 (4th Cir. 1987), in which the hiring criteria for a Virginia county registrar was
examined, Fields, 566 F.3d at 389–90 (citing McConnell, 829 F.2d 1319). The court reasoned that McConnell, which held that partisan affiliation was an inappropriate criterion to
consider for a registrar’s position, did not clearly put defendants in Fields’s case on notice
because a registrar “is even less involved in policy-making than is a local director.” Id. at
390.
215. Fields, 566 F.3d at 390.
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Fields’s constitutional rights, it held that they were entitled to qualified immunity.216
IV.

ANALYSIS

In Fields v. Prater, the Fourth Circuit held that the position of local
director of social services in Virginia is one for which political affiliation may not constitutionally be used as a hiring criterion.217 In so
holding, the court appropriately sought to determine whether the hiring authority could demonstrate that party affiliation was an appropriate requirement for the performance of the position.218 The court
applied the two-pronged analysis adopted by the Fourth Circuit, but
missed an opportunity to refine its test and to provide greater guidance to the district courts by looking to other circuits’ tests on the
issue.219 Although the court’s analysis found that a violation of constitutional rights occurred, it also held that because at the time of the
hiring decision the law did not clearly establish that the consideration
of political affiliation was unconstitutional, the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.220 In so holding, the court properly
granted the defendants immunity, but failed to provide greater clarity
to lower courts and future litigants on when a defendant should be
entitled to that immunity.221
A. The Court Correctly Sought to Determine If the Hiring Authority
Could Demonstrate that Political Affiliation Was an
Appropriate Requirement for the Effective Performance of
the Position
The court was first required to determine if the use of political
affiliation was an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the position of local director of social services, based on the
Supreme Court’s Elrod-Branti framework.222 In Fields, the plaintiff alleged that her rights had been violated when the defendants conspired to prevent her hiring based on her political affiliation.223
Recognizing that the case fell within the framework, the court ac216. Id.
217. Id. at 391.
218. See infra Part IV.A.
219. See infra Part IV.B.
220. Fields, 566 F.3d at 391.
221. See infra Part IV.C.
222. See Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 79 (1990) (holding that the
rule in Elrod and Branti on dismissal based on political affiliation extends to promotions,
transfers, recalls from layoff, and hiring decisions).
223. Fields, 566 F.3d at 385.

\\server05\productn\M\MLR\69-3\MLR307.txt

2010]

unknown

FIELDS V. PRATER

Seq: 26

25-MAY-10

9:56

781

knowledged that its ultimate task was to determine whether the defendants could show that political affiliation would impact job
performance.224 If they could not show that, then Fields’s constitutional rights had been violated.225
Fields, of course, had no right to the benefit of government employment and she could be denied that benefit for any number of
reasons.226 The court recognized, however, that political affiliation
may not be one of those reasons.227 Before the court could determine
that the benefit had been improperly denied, it first needed to engage
in the aforementioned analysis of the position within the Elrod-Branti
framework.228 The Supreme Court, however, had only provided basic
guidance to the lower courts on this issue.229 Thus, the court rightly
turned to circuit precedent where the Elrod-Branti framework had
been more thoroughly developed.230

224. Id. at 386; see also Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980) (stating that in these
cases, defendants must “demonstrate that party affiliation [was] an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved”).
225. Fields, 566 F.3d at 385–86; see also Branti, 445 U.S. at 518–20 (evaluating the claims
of two assistant public defenders under the new standard articulated by the Court and
finding a violation of their rights had occurred).
226. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (stating that generally, no person has a right to a government benefit, but if the government offers benefits, there are
simply some reasons upon which it may not rely in denying those benefits); Christopher V.
Fenlon, Note, The Spoils System in Check? Public Employees’ Right to Political Affiliation & the
Balkanized Policymaking Exception to § 1983 Liability for Wrongful Termination, 30 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2295, 2295 (2009) (explaining that, historically, “[a] government job was not viewed
as a right but as a privilege; thus, employees had no property interest in their jobs, and no
standing to challenge their dismissal”).
227. See Branti, 445 U.S. at 515–16; Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1976) (plurality opinion); Perry, 408 U.S. at 597; see also Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605–10
(1967) (holding laws that barred employment within the state university system unconstitutional, insofar as they prohibited members of the Communist Party from gaining employment when they did not show specific intent to “further the unlawful aims” of the party).
228. See, e.g., Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 75–79 (1990) (applying
the conclusions in Elrod and Branti to determine if promotions, transfers, and recalls from
layoff based on political affiliation or support were an impermissible infringement on public employees’ First Amendment rights).
229. See id. at 79 (remanding employment cases involving promotion, transfer, recall
from layoff, and hiring decisions to a lower court for further proceedings after bringing
those actions within the Elrod-Branti framework); Branti, 445 U.S. at 518–20 (refining the
standard from Elrod without substantial specificity on how to apply it).
230. See infra Part IV.B.
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The Court Properly Applied Fourth Circuit Precedent but Failed to
Refine Its Test Further to Provide Greater Future Guidance to
the District Courts in This Area

In an examination that harkened back to the original test laid out
by a Supreme Court plurality in Elrod v. Burns,231 the court sought to
determine whether the position at issue was a “policymaking” position.232 While the court implicitly acknowledged that this inquiry was
not dispositive,233 it noted that Fourth Circuit precedents that developed the Elrod-Branti framework considered it a worthwhile inquiry.234
Ultimately, however, the court correctly applied the test adopted by
the Fourth Circuit in Stott v. Haworth,235 which governs cases in this
area.
In applying the test, the court rightfully determined that, in a
general sense, the position of a local director of social services is one
in which “legitimate political disagreement over the goals or the implementation of social services programs”236 might exist.237 As such,
the court moved on to a more thorough examination of the position
of local director of social services that was at issue in the litigation.238
The court’s findings under the second prong of the Stott test paid
homage to a litany of Fourth Circuit precedents. It acknowledged, for
instance, that the refined inquiry required by Branti was one of degree, and that even if the local director of social services had some
low-level policymaking authority, the existence of such authority did
231. 427 U.S. at 372.
232. Fields v. Prater, 566 F.3d 381, 386 (4th Cir. 2009).
233. Id.; see also Branti, 445 U.S. at 518 (“[T]he ultimate inquiry is not whether the label
‘policymaker’ . . . fits a particular position . . . .”); Susan Lorde Martin, A Decade of Branti
Decisions: A Government Official’s Guide to Patronage Dismissals, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 11, 22
(1989) (“The primary effect of Branti, then, is to change the categorical exceptions established in Elrod. No longer are the descriptions ‘policymaker’ or ‘confidant’ determinative
in deciding whether an employee may constitutionally be dismissed because of political
affiliation.” (footnote call numbers omitted)).
234. Fields, 566 F.3d at 386; see Martin, supra note 233, at 22 (“[A]lthough the labels
‘policymaker’ and ‘confidant’ may be relevant to the inquiry, they do not mandate a conclusion.” (footnote call number omitted)).
235. 916 F.2d 134, 141–42 (4th Cir. 1990); see Fields, 566 F.3d at 386–88 (applying Stott).
236. Fields, 566 F.3d at 386.
237. Social services can easily be categorized as a government service where the goals
and implementation of the service are a point of contention between the major parties,
with their “‘goals or programs affect[ing] the direction, pace, or quality’” of the government services. Stott, 916 F.2d at 141–42 (quoting Jimenez Fuentes v. Torres Gaztambide,
807 F.2d 236, 241–42 (1st Cir. 1986) (en banc)).
238. Fields, 566 F.3d at 386.

R
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not necessarily mean that political affiliation related to the position.239
The court also properly noted that although various Virginia laws designated the director’s position as non-partisan, the state law’s determination was not dispositive of the constitutional issue, which was
“ultimately a question of federal law.”240 Despite the fact that these
and other precedents form the bedrock of Fourth Circuit jurisprudence in this area, the court squandered an opportunity to reach
outside of the confines of the circuit to refine its test.241
The need to improve the Stott test has become increasingly evident over time. The test’s continued application by the Fourth Circuit has demonstrated that it is extremely useful for making case-bycase determinations as to whether a particular government position
does or does not depend on partisan affiliation to function effectively.242 The test, however, fails to provide clear guidance for the
lower courts in the circuit because a Stott analysis of two or more extremely similar positions may reach very different conclusions about
the appropriateness of considering political affiliation in various employment decisions.243
239. Id. at 386–87; see also Akers v. Caperton, 998 F.2d 220, 225 (4th Cir. 1993) (finding
that a low-level position with some characteristics of a position for which political affiliation
is relevant is in fact protected from political considerations).
240. See Fields, 566 F.3d at 388 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting McCrerey v.
Allen, 118 F.3d 242, 245 (4th Cir. 1997)).
241. The Fourth Circuit has historically been slow to move and adapt in this area of law.
See Martin, supra note 233, at 24–42 (comparing the development of political patronage
dismissal law in each federal circuit and finding little development in the Fourth Circuit as
compared to several other circuits as of 1989). Before adopting the First Circuit’s ElrodBranti test in Stott, the Fourth Circuit had perhaps the least developed and least clear test of
all the circuits in cases involving political affiliation and government employment. See id.
(examining the development of the Elrod-Branti framework by each federal circuit and
finding that the Fourth Circuit, compared to other circuits, provided virtually no clear
standards by which political affiliation cases would be judged).
242. See Jenkins v. Medford, 119 F.3d 1156, 1162–64 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (applying
Stott and holding that the position of deputy sheriff in North Carolina was one for which
political affiliation is an appropriate job requirement); Stott, 916 F.2d at 142–43 (adopting
the First Circuit’s test for political affiliation-based employment action cases and holding
that various positions in North Carolina state government were exempt from civil service
protection and that the occupants of those positions were properly dismissed). The principles behind the test, although the case is not specifically cited, also support the other postStott Fourth Circuit decisions. See, e.g., Knight v. Vernon, 214 F.3d 544, 549–51 (4th Cir.
2000) (holding that a jailer’s political allegiance to the sheriff was not an appropriate requirement for her job performance without citing Stott); Akers, 998 F.2d at 224–25 (applying largely the Stott principles without citing Stott and holding that the position of county
highway maintenance superintendent in West Virginia was one for which political affiliation could not be a basis for dismissal).
243. Compare Fields, 566 F.3d at 386 (applying the Stott test and finding the position of
local director of social services in Virginia was not one for which political affiliation could
be considered relevant to job performance), with Nader v. Blair, 549 F.3d 953, 959–60 (4th

R
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The Fields case presents a ready example of this problem. In Nader v. Blair,244 the Fourth Circuit applied the Stott test and held that
the position of assistant director of social services in Maryland was a
position for which political affiliation was related to effective job performance.245 Yet, only one year later, the Fourth Circuit in Fields
reached the opposite conclusion for the similar and higher-ranking
position of local director of social services in Virginia.246 Although
this demonstrates that the Stott test is useful for making position-specific determinations, it also suggests that virtually every government
position in every individual state within the circuit could potentially
be subject to close scrutiny through litigation.247 Even a decision by
the Fourth Circuit itself would only carry weight as it related to a position in a single state, a single county, or just a single municipality.248
This is an invitation to waste judicial time and resources when a few
modifications to the test would prevent unmeritorious cases from proceeding to trial or at least discourage appeals to the Fourth Circuit.249
Other circuits have adopted their own tests or look to certain factors in order to determine whether partisan affiliation is rationally related to the performance of a government position.250 Some of these
inquiries could feasibly be used to augment one or both prongs of the
Stott test.251 The Second Circuit, for instance, examines a position using a list of eight separate factors,252 none of which is dispositive,253 to
Cir. 2008) (applying the Stott test and finding the position of assistant director of social
services in Maryland was one for which political affiliation could be considered relevant to
job performance).
244. 549 F.3d 953.
245. Id. at 959–61. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the defendant in a lawsuit alleging politically motivated termination. Id.
at 962.
246. Fields, 566 F.3d at 388–89.
247. See Stott, 916 F.2d at 141 (acknowledging that courts are bound to scrutinize patronage dismissals “after the fact” to determine which positions properly fall within the
patronage system).
248. See id. at 144–45 (listing various government positions that courts across the country have found to be subject to removal based on political affiliation and other positions
where the opposite is true).
249. See Fenlon, supra note 226, at 2298 (noting that uncertainties resulting from overly
diverse, variable standards in Elrod-Branti cases can result in the unnecessary expenditure
of government resources in the litigation of wrongful termination suits). The potentially
unnecessary expenditure of resources also weighs heavily in qualified immunity analyses.
See infra Part IV.C.
250. See supra Part II.B.1.
251. See Vezzetti v. Pellegrini, 22 F.3d 483, 486 (2d Cir. 1994) (listing several factors,
such as “exempt[ion] from civil service protection,” “[perception] as a policymaker by the
public,” and “[responsiveness] to partisan politics and political leaders,” that courts in the
Second Circuit consider in cases involving political affiliation and employment actions).
252. See supra text accompanying note 103.

R
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determine whether political affiliation has a bearing on job performance.254 The Fourth Circuit, to date, has no consistent list of factors it
considers when it examines a position in a political affiliation case.255
Alternatively, the Fourth Circuit could follow the lead of the Sixth Circuit and create different “categories” of government positions in order to determine when political affiliation is or is not an appropriate
requirement for the position.256 This would create a significant presumption that political affiliation was or was not appropriate for a particular government job, since the Sixth Circuit’s categories are broadly
descriptive.257 Given the evident variations between similarly titled
government jobs across state lines,258 however, the categories would
likely be ineffective in resolving disputes early or altogether preventing unnecessary litigation since individualized examination would be
necessary to properly categorize each particular position regardless of
superficial similarities in titles or duties.259
Supplementing the Stott test with a formally adopted, explicit list
of factors to consider would likely provide the greatest guidance to
253. Vezzetti, 22 F.3d at 486.
254. See Regan v. Boogertman, 984 F.2d 577, 580 (2d Cir. 1993) (“We have interpreted
the Branti test to mean ‘that political affiliation is an appropriate requirement when there
is a rational connection between shared ideology and job performance.’ It is necessary to
scrutinize the functions of the position to determine whether there is that connection.”
(citation omitted)).
255. See Nader v. Blair, 549 F.3d 953, 959–61 (4th Cir. 2008) (noting several factors
various courts have considered in Elrod-Branti cases and subsequently evaluating an assistant director of social services’s budget responsibilities, ability to shape policy and programs, and interactions with politicians, departments, and other agencies); Jenkins v.
Medford, 119 F.3d 1156, 1162–64 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (examining and considering
the “specific political and social roles” of sheriff’s deputies in North Carolina); Stott v.
Haworth, 916 F.2d 134, 142 (4th Cir. 1990) (examining the rationale for creating positions
exempt from civil service protection and concluding that when such a position is held it
indicates a presumption at law that discharge or demotion was proper); see also Fenlon,
supra note 226, at 2315 (noting that the use of several common factors is already “apparent” across several circuits, including the Fourth Circuit, even if the circuit has not formally
adopted the use of the factors in its case law).
256. See, e.g., McCloud v. Testa, 97 F.3d 1536, 1557–58 (6th Cir. 1996) (creating categories of government positions for consideration in patronage cases).
257. See supra note 112.
258. Compare Fields v. Prater, 566 F.3d 381, 386 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that a local
director of social services in Virginia was a position for which political affiliation could not
be considered in hiring), with Nader, 549 F.3d at 960 (holding that an assistant director of
social services in Maryland was a position for which political affiliation could be considered
in dismissal).
259. See McCloud, 97 F.3d at 1558 (acknowledging that despite superficial appearances
that may have placed certain positions into the categories devised by the court, a deeper
factual inquiry into the responsibilities of each position was still necessary to properly categorize each one).

R

R
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district court judges.260 The circuit’s recent decisions suggest that the
designation of a position as “political” or “non-political” can vary substantially across state lines, even for ostensibly similar positions.261
Such state-to-state variations, as well as potential differences at more
local levels, create ambiguity and result in difficult cases.262 Refinement is necessary so lower courts have a substantially better idea of
what they are looking for when a government position’s political (or
non-political) nature is litigated.263 Barring any further clarification
of the Elrod-Branti framework by the Supreme Court,264 since each
government position must be considered individually, the Fourth Circuit should refine its test to encourage summary judgment decisions
and discourage fruitless appeals.265 Painting a clearer picture of the
law can only serve to ultimately conserve resources, judicial or
otherwise.266

260. But see Fenlon, supra note 226, at 2327–29 (advocating the wider adoption of the
categorical approach adopted by the Sixth Circuit and arguing that such an approach provides a “coherent, comprehensive framework” for decisions).
261. See supra note 258.
262. The Fields court, for example, acknowledged that this case was a “close question”
due in part to the necessarily intensive factual inquiries required when a government position is subject to litigation in these cases. Fields, 566 F.3d at 390.
263. See Fenlon, supra note 226, at 2300 (advocating reform to the Elrod-Branti line of
cases, but by the Supreme Court rather than the individual circuits because Elrod and
Branti left this area of law an “unsettled field,” making workable lower court application
difficult).
264. See Martin, supra note 233, at 23–24 (noting that it is the lower courts that provide
guidance as to when First Amendment protection exists for public employees and that
those courts have necessarily attempted to craft objective criteria to make those
determinations).
265. See Fenlon, supra note 226, at 2298 (noting that “under-developed and varying standards” under Elrod-Branti encourage wasteful litigation of wrongful termination suits); see
also Robert C. Wigton, The Supreme Court and Political Patronage: The Rutan Decision in Context, 2 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 273, 281–82 (1992) (explaining that in the face of
“limited definitional guidance” from the Supreme Court under Elrod-Branti, it is the federal circuits that individually refine the criteria used to determine when a position falls
within the Elrod-Branti framework).
266. See Stott v. Haworth, 916 F.2d 134, 144–45 (4th Cir. 1990) (listing the “cases, plentiful in number,” that had been considered across the country under the Elrod-Branti framework as of late 1990). In the Fourth Circuit alone, the list of positions considered under
the framework has grown in the last twenty years. See, e.g., Nader v. Blair, 549 F.3d 953,
956, 959 (4th Cir. 2008) (considering the position of Assistant Director of Business Management and Financial Services in the Baltimore City Department of Social Services);
Knight v. Vernon, 214 F.3d 544, 545 (4th Cir. 2000) (considering the position of jailer in
Rockingham County, North Carolina); Akers v. Caperton, 998 F.2d 220, 222–23 (4th Cir.
1993) (considering the position of County Maintenance Superintendent in West Virginia).

R

R
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C. The Court Properly Granted the Defendants Qualified Immunity but
Failed to Clarify When Constitutional Rights Are “Clearly
Established” for Future Political Affiliation Cases
The court’s final task in Fields was to determine if the defendants
were entitled to qualified immunity. Using the Stott test, the court
determined that under the first part of the qualified immunity analysis,267 the local directors had violated Fields’s constitutional rights.268
The court then correctly recognized that the defendants did not know
or should not have known that they were violating Fields’s constitutional rights when they refused to hire her based on her political affiliation, and the court granted them qualified immunity.269 Fourth
Circuit precedent, in fact, provided a superficially strong indication
that the position of local director of social services was one for which
political affiliation could be a criterion in hiring.270 Only a deeper,
fact-intensive inquiry, one hardly suited to a non-lawyer, eventually revealed the stark differences that set this case apart from precedent.271
Furthermore, the defendants could not have known that they were
violating Fields’s constitutional rights just because Virginia law and related state regulations forbade the consideration of political affiliation
in hiring a local director.272
It is unlikely the defendants would have realized that a twenty
year old case analyzing the position of county registrar would be considered the best guide for their actions,273 as the court eventually
267. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001) (“[T]he first inquiry must be whether a
constitutional right would have been violated on the facts alleged . . . .”).
268. Fields v. Prater, 566 F.3d 381, 389 (4th Cir. 2009). The Fields court did not deviate
from the order of inquiries established in Saucier even though the Supreme Court held
several months before Fields that lower courts could exercise their own discretion in the
order of inquiries. See Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009).
269. Fields, 566 F.3d at 390; see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817–18 (1982)
(“We . . . hold that government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.” (citations omitted)).
270. See Nader, 549 F.3d at 959–62 (holding that a nearly identical position in the state of
Maryland was subject to political affiliation considerations).
271. See Fields, 566 F.3d at 386–90 (conducting an intensive factual inquiry of the position at issue and ultimately awarding qualified immunity to the defendants based on factual distinctions from precedent cases).
272. See Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 515 (1994) (explaining that an official’s violation of a state administrative regulation does not automatically permit the plaintiff in a 42
U.S.C. § 1983 action to overcome the official’s qualified immunity).
273. See McConnell v. Adams, 829 F.2d 1319, 1323–24 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that
county registrars in Virginia may not be selected based on partisan affiliation because state
statutes do not require it, party affiliation would detract from job performance, and such
affiliation is otherwise unnecessary to the performance of the position).
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found.274 In the initial litigation, the district judge essentially sought
to hold the defendants responsible for failing to predict the outcome
of a court decision that had yet to occur;275 thus, the court could not
allow this result to stand.276 Yet its decision does little to solve an
ongoing confusion in the case law.277 The court should have gone
further and sought to bring greater clarity to the law and reduce the
number of “gray areas”278 within the Fourth Circuit.
A court’s qualified immunity analysis is not meant to “turn on the
precise nature of various officials’ duties or the precise character of
the particular rights alleged to have been violated.”279 Analogy to factually similar situations can be and often is essential in this analysis.280
It is true that the court in Fields drew an analogy to a similar case, but
drawing analogies in litigation that a government official cannot reasonably be expected to discover in the course of his work leads to a
fatal flaw in the qualified immunity analysis.281 If government officials
responsible for various employment decisions involving government
employees are not provided clear guidance, then the qualified immunity defense falls into the trap that the Supreme Court sought to
avoid, namely having qualified immunity analyses turn on fact-specific
situations.282 The defense becomes a blanket shield for a multitude of
actions, allowing defendant officials to escape both litigation and liability because immunity ends up turning on the nature of the duties of

274. Fields, 566 F.3d at 389–90; see also Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir.
1992) (“Officials are not liable for bad guesses in gray areas; they are liable for transgressing bright lines.”).
275. See Fields v. Justus, No. 1:07cv00019, 2008 WL 863723, at *5–6 (W.D. Va. Mar. 31,
2008) (holding that the law in this area was clearly established based on a case involving
electoral registrars and denying the defendants qualified immunity on that basis).
276. Fields, 566 F.3d at 390; see Akers v. Caperton, 998 F.2d 220, 227 (4th Cir. 1993)
(opining that holding an official accountable for failing to predict the outcome of possible
future litigation would be a “‘miscarriage of justice’” (citation omitted)).
277. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Medford, 119 F.3d 1156, 1160 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (acknowledging that the case law issued by lower courts on the Elrod-Branti standard is “‘conflicting and confusing’” at best (citation omitted)).
278. Maciariello, 973 F.2d at 298.
279. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 643 (1987).
280. Id. at 640; McConnell v. Adams, 829 F.2d 1319, 1325 (4th Cir. 1987).
281. See Fields, 566 F.3d at 389–90 (granting defendants qualified immunity only after an
intensive factual analysis of the position at issue).
282. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 643 (“[W]e have been unwilling to complicate qualified
immunity analysis by making the scope or extent of immunity turn on the precise nature of
various officials’ duties or the precise character of the particular rights alleged to have
been violated.”).
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the position at issue or of the rights violated.283 Officials who might
not otherwise deserve immunity may escape liability by claiming they
did not know that they were violating a constitutionally protected
right.284
The decision to grant the defendants qualified immunity in Fields
ultimately provides a further indication of the need to reform the test
used to determine whether a government position is one for which
political affiliation may be properly considered.285 The defendants in
Fields perhaps should have known that they were violating Fields’s constitutional rights, given the guidance provided by the numerous cases
decided in the Supreme Court and the various courts of appeals
around the country on so many different government positions.286
The apparently clear dictates of such cases become muddled, however, since each one hinges so specifically on its own facts.287
All courts should seek to provide greater guidance so that an
identical factual nexus need not be identified in order to defeat an
official’s claim of qualified immunity in every case.288 By refining its
test as outlined above, the Fourth Circuit could begin this process.289
Judges, lawyers, and potential litigants alike would have a much better
understanding of the applicable constitutional law if they knew what
283. Contra id. (implying that such requirements might subject more officials, not less,
to litigation since their actions would lack an “assurance of protection that it is the object”
of the qualified immunity doctrine to provide).
284. See Assaf v. Fields, 178 F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir. 1999) (warning that narrowly focused
and individualized immunity rules allow officials “‘one liability-free violation of a constitutional or statutory requirement’” (citation omitted)); see also Nancy Leong, The Saucier
Qualified Immunity Experiment: An Empirical Analysis, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 667, 668 (2009) (“If
courts repeatedly hold that a particular right is not clearly established, without ever defining the contours of that right, then government actors may be able to repeatedly engage in
unconstitutional conduct without ever incurring liability for their actions.”).
285. See supra Part IV.B.
286. See, e.g., Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518–20 (1980) (holding that a government
hiring authority bears the burden of demonstrating that partisan affiliation is an appropriate requirement for effective performance of the position at issue, and laying the groundwork for future cases on such issues); Nader v. Blair, 549 F.3d 953, 959–62 (4th Cir. 2008)
(analyzing a state-level social services office under the Stott test to determine whether it was
one for which political affiliation was an appropriate criterion in a dismissal action).
287. See, e.g., Nader, 549 F.3d at 959–62 (making a determination after an intensive factbased inquiry that an assistant director of social services in Maryland is subject to political
affiliation considerations in employment actions).
288. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 (“This is not to say that an official action is protected
by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful . . . .”); McConnell v. Adams, 829 F.2d 1319, 1325 (4th Cir. 1987) (“[P]ublic officers
should not automatically receive qualified immunity simply because there is not a strict
factual nexus between their actions and the precedent establishing the right allegedly
violated.”).
289. See supra Part IV.B.
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specific factors a court needed to look for in political affiliation
cases.290 Unless every single position where partisan affiliation may or
may not be an appropriate criterion for hiring, dismissal, promotion,
transfer, or recall is going to be litigated in the near future, “I didn’t
know” cannot continue to be a valid excuse for the violation of an
individual’s rights.
V. CONCLUSION
In Fields v. Prater, the Fourth Circuit held that it was unconstitutional to consider political affiliation in hiring a local director of social
services in Virginia.291 The court further held that because the law
was unclear on this matter at the time of the hiring decision at issue,
the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.292 The court
properly sought to determine whether political affiliation was relevant
to the effective performance of the position at issue.293 It also properly analyzed the position at both a broad level and a narrower, more
specific level in line with circuit precedent, but failed to avail itself of
the opportunity to further refine the circuit’s test in order to provide
greater guidance to lower courts.294 Finally, the court properly found
that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity in this case,
but again it forfeited an opportunity to provide greater clarity on the
issue to judges, government officials, and potential litigants as to when
it is clearly established that a given position is entitled to protection
from the consideration of political affiliation in hiring, dismissal, and
other employment decisions.295 The Fourth Circuit must act soon to
clarify the analyses used in cases such as Fields by providing government officials with less ambiguous criteria; the current lack of such
clarity serves only to generate continuous litigation over numerous positions and transforms the defense of qualified immunity into a blanket protection for government officials that it was never intended to
become.296
290. See Assaf v. Fields, 178 F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir. 1999) (opining that a “lack of ‘bright
line’ rules” cannot “continually provide cover for violations of constitutional rights” by government officials); see also Leong, supra note 284, at 682 (“[I]f a particular constitutional
principle is already ‘clear,’ then any government official who acted in contravention of that
principle would already be unable to raise the defense of qualified immunity.”).
291. Fields v. Prater, 566 F.3d 381, 386 (4th Cir. 2009).
292. Id. at 389.
293. See supra Part IV.A.
294. See supra Part IV.B.
295. See supra Part IV.C.
296. See supra Part IV.B–C.
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